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Blinding prosecutors
to defendants’ race: A
policy proposal to reduce
unconscious bias in the
criminal justice system
Sunita Sah, Christopher T. Robertson, & Shima B. Baughman

abstract

4

Racial minorities are disproportionately imprisoned in the United States.
This disparity is unlikely to be due solely to differences in criminal behavior.
Behavioral science research has documented that prosecutors harbor
unconscious racial biases. These unconscious biases play a role whenever
prosecutors exercise their broad discretion, such as in choosing what
crimes to charge and when negotiating plea bargains. To reduce this risk of
unconscious racial bias, we propose a policy change: Prosecutors should
be blinded to the race of criminal defendants wherever feasible. This could
be accomplished by removing information identifying or suggesting the
defendant’s race from police dossiers shared with prosecutors and by
avoiding mentions of race in conversations between prosecutors and
defense attorneys. Race is almost always irrelevant to the merits of a
criminal prosecution; it should be omitted from the proceedings whenever
possible for the sake of justice.
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race: A policy proposal to reduce unconscious bias in the criminal justice system. Behavioral Science & Policy, 1(2), pp. 83–91.
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Core Findings
What is the issue?
Racial disparities in
the criminal justice
system are pronounced.
Black Americans are
overrepresented in prison
populations, and they
tend to be given harsher
sentences than White
offenders. Reform that
blinds prosecutors to
race can mitigate the
effects of both explicit and
implicit bias, particularly
in charge filing and plea
bargain negotiations.

How can you act?
Selected
recommendations include:
1) Pilot-testing race
blinding interventions in
different stages of the
criminal justice process
to assess effectiveness
2) Including imperatives
for race-blinding
in the ethics codes
and guidelines of
both statewide and
national legal bodies

Who should take
the lead?
Behavioral science
researchers, policymakers
in criminal justice and law
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rosecutors may have more independent
power and discretion than any other
government officials in the United States.1
Prosecutors decide whether to initiate criminal proceedings, what charges to file or bring
before a grand jury, how and when to prosecute individuals, and what penalties to seek. For
a given criminal behavior, half a dozen charges
might apply, ranging from minor misdemeanors
to the most serious felonies. A prosecutor can
decline to press charges altogether or stack
charges by characterizing the same behavior as
violating the law dozens of times (charging each
phone call made as part of a drug transaction
as a crime, for instance). Once charged, about
95% of criminal cases are resolved through plea
bargaining, where prosecutors can defer prosecution, suspend a sentence, minimize factual
allegations in ways that virtually guarantee a light
sentence, or insist on the most severe penalties. 2 If a case does go to trial, a prosecutor’s
sentencing demand provides an influential reference point (an anchor) for a defense attorney’s
response in plea negotiations and the judge’s
final sentencing decision. 3

Prosecutors typically do not need to articulate
the bases for their discretionary decisions,4,5 and
these decisions receive only minimal scrutiny
from the courts. Although the U.S. Constitution
theoretically limits the discretion of prosecutors (to target a particular race prejudicially, for
instance), such protections are exceedingly
difficult to invoke,6 especially if a prosecutor’s unconscious rather than intentional bias
is in play.7 This context prompts us to offer an
important and novel proposal with the potential
to help make the justice system blind to race.
Prosecutors, we believe, should be unaware
of d
 efendants’ race whenever possible. Implementing such a significant change would be
challenging, clearly. But evidence of persistent
disparities regarding the proportion of racial
minorities that are put in prison makes the need
for change apparent. And growing evidence that
prosecutors’ unconscious biases contribute to
that imbalance gives us a potentially powerful
target for efforts to produce positive and vitally
needed change.

Racial Bias in the Criminal
Justice System
In 2010 in the United States, Blacks made up
38% of all prisoners, although they made up
only 12% of the national population. 8 That
same year, about one in 23 Black men was in
prison, compared with one in 147 White men.9
The causes of this racial disparity are many and
complex. Socioeconomic factors (poverty and
lower educational achievement, for example)
play a role. So may inequitable police behavior
that, for example, leads to Blacks being stopped
and frisked more often than Whites are.10,11
Black defendants also tend to receive harsher
sentences than White defendants do, even
when both the severity of the crime and previous
criminal history are taken into account.12 For
example, harsher punishment was applied to
crimes related to crack cocaine versus powder
cocaine in federal sentencing guidelines, which
tended to punish Blacks more harshly because
they were more likely to be arrested with crack
cocaine than powder cocaine. To minimize this
disparate impact on Blacks, Congress passed the
Fair Sentencing Act in 2010, which reduced the
unequal penalties and eliminated the five-year
mandatory minimum sentence for simple crack
cocaine possession. This new law addressed the
racial bias perpetrated by the old regime that led
to low-level crack dealers, who were often Black,
receiving more severe sentences than wholesale
suppliers of powdered cocaine.13
One important cause of the racial discrepancy among prisoners, however, is bias that
affects discretionary decisions made by prosecutors.14–17 A recent review of empirical studies
examining prosecutorial decision making and
race found that most of the studies suggested
that the defendants’ “race directly or indirectly
influenced case outcomes, even when a host of
other legal or extra-legal factors are taken into
account.”17 Minorities, particularly Black males,
“receive disproportionately harsher treatment at
each stage of the prosecutorial decision-making
process.”18 Indeed, prosecutors in predominantly
Black communities have been shown to make
racially biased decisions, such as overcharging
Black youth,19 which, in turn, perpetuates racial
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stereotypes. 20,21 Further, Black children in the
United States are much more likely than White
children to be sentenced as adults, 22 probably
because Black juveniles are perceived to be
older and less childlike than White juveniles. 23,24
These data do not suggest that prosecutors are
overtly racist, although some may be. Instead,
research documents that bias can infect even
people with the best of intentions, including
physicians and other professionals. 25,26 Prosecutors are humans with bounded rationality,
making decisions in a cultural milieu that shapes
their perceptions and decisions on an unconscious level. 15,27,28 Generally, bias increases in
ambiguous situations,20,29–33 and as we described
previously, decisions on what and how many
charges to file against a defendant are inherently
ambiguous.
Behavioral science researchers have demonstrated that people unknowingly misremember
case facts in racially biased ways. 34,35 For
example, there is a greater tendency to
remember aggressive actions (e.g., punches or
kicks) if a suspect is Black. 34 In fact, it appears
that the more stereotypically Black a defendant
is perceived to be, the more likely that person is
to be sentenced to death. 36 In one study, Stanford University students viewed photographs of
Black men, rating each one on the degree to
which the person’s appearance was stereotypically Black. The students were told they could
base their decisions on any of the features of
the photographed subjects to make their decisions, including noses, lips, skin tone, and hair.
Unbeknownst to the students, each man in
the images had been convicted of murdering
a White person. The men the students rated as
appearing more stereotypically Black were more
likely to have been sentenced to death in criminal
proceedings.36 Other research has demonstrated
that lighter skin tones may lead to more lenient
judgments and prison sentences. 20,37
Although bias exists throughout the criminal
justice system, bias in prosecutorial decisions
has a potentially disproportionate impact, given
that most criminal cases do not go to trial and
prosecutors exercise such wide discretion in
handling them. One might hope that selecting

“bias affects discretionary
decisions made by
prosecutors”
prosecutors of good faith and asking them to
behave professionally could avert racial bias. In
this vein, in 2014, the Department of Justice reaffirmed its policy that “in making decisions . . . law
enforcement officers may not use race.”38 Such a
policy, although laudable, unfortunately cannot
prevent unconscious bias.
Prosecutorial decisions are made in a more
deliberative fashion than, for example, splitsecond decisions made by police to shoot
or not shoot. However, even with deliberative decisions, the ability to self-regulate bias is
difficult: Moral reasoning is usually a post hoc
construction, generated after a (usually intuitive)
judgment has been reached,39 often influenced
by erroneous factors.40 People exhibiting bias are
typically unaware that they are doing so, and bias
is often unintentional. 33,41,42 Educating people
on unconscious bias often leads them to be
convinced that other people are biased but that
they themselves are not.29 Accordingly, strategies
to encourage people to become less biased are
usually not sufficient.
One program that had some success in reducing
racial disparities was the 2006 Prosecution and
Racial Justice Program of the Vera Institute of
Justice. Prosecutors collected and published
data on defendant and victim race for each
offense category and the prosecutorial action
taken at each stage of criminal proceedings.43
These data exposed that similarly situated defendants of different races were treated differently
at each stage of discretion: initial case screening,
charging, plea offers, and final disposition. For
instance, in Wisconsin, the data showed that
prosecutors were charging Black defendants
at higher rates than White defendants for drug
possession. With this information, the district
attorney made an office policy to refer suspects
to drug treatment rather than charging them
in an attempt to reduce racial bias in charging.
However, this approach requires a large
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“prosecutors should be blinded to the race
of criminal defendants whenever possible”
investment from overburdened prosecutorial
offices to collect and analyze their data to reveal
trends in racial disparity. It also requires that individual prosecutors be motivated to consciously
avoid bias or at least be motivated to appear
unbiased.44,45 This motivation is often led by societal norms or public pressure regarding racial
attitudes and inequality, which varies by jurisdiction. There presently is no complete solution to
eliminate racial bias in prosecutorial decisions.

Blinding: An Alternative
Approach to Managing Bias
An alternative way to manage bias is to acknowledge its existence and create institutional
procedures to prevent bias from influencing
important decisions. The psychologist Robert
Rosenthal, a leading methodologist, concluded
that the best way to reduce the chances of bias
unconsciously affecting decision processes is to
keep the process “as blind as possible for as long
as possible.”46
Blinding (or masking) to improve decisionmaking has a long history in different domains.
For example, having musicians audition behind
a screen decreased gender bias and increased
the acceptance rate of women into symphony
orchestras.47 In medical science, both subjects
and researchers are, whenever feasible, kept
unaware of who is in the treatment or control
groups of clinical trials, in an effort to achieve
unbiased results.48 Meta-analyses have shown
that such blinding reduces the number of false
positives in science experiments.49,50 Similarly,
editors of scholarly journals routinely remove
authors’ names and institutions from submissions so they can assess articles on their scientific
merits alone.51 Likewise, to avoid possible favoritism, some professors mask students’ identities
on papers when grading.52
Blinding is already in use in other stages of the
criminal justice process. For example, lineups are
widely acknowledged to be best conducted by
an officer who does not know which person is
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the suspect, so as not to pollute the eyewitness’s
perceptions.53,54 This practice of blind administration of lineups was originally highly controversial.
Iowa State University professor Gary Wells first
proposed implementing blinding of police to
suspect lineups in 1988, 55 although evidence
of bias and erroneous identification had been
accumulating for years before that. More than
a decade later, in 1999, the U.S. Department
of Justice published a set of best practices for
conducting police lineups56 that excluded blind
procedures (although it acknowledged that
having investigators who did not know which
person in the lineup was the suspect was desirable) because blinding “may be impractical for
some jurisdictions to implement” (p. 9).56 Nevertheless, individual jurisdictions experimented
with blind procedures. 57 By 2014, the National
Research Council recommended unreservedly
that all lineups should be conducted with the
benefits of blinding.58
Blinding has also been recommended for
forensic scientists and other expert witnesses,
so that attorneys for either side in a case do not
influence and undermine their scientific expertise. 32 More generally, the rules of evidence
(which determine what is permissible in court)
can be understood as an elaborate blinding
procedure, designed to ensure that juries are
not exposed to irrelevant or unreliable evidence,
recognizing that for the purpose of assessing
guilt, some factors are more prejudicial than
probative.59

The Case for Blinded
Prosecutors
The success of the long-standing practice of
blinding in other contexts gives credence to our
proposal that prosecutors should be blinded
to the race of criminal defendants whenever
possible. Prosecutors, like other professionals,
cannot be biased by what they do not know.
In addition to mitigating unconscious bias,
the blinding of prosecutors also mitigates any
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conscious racism, which may infect some
prosecutors.
Federal prosecutors already use a race-blinding
procedure for death penalty decisions. The
Department of Justice requires that attorneys
on committees of capital cases (which determine death eligibility) review each defendant file
only after information related to the race of the
defendant has been removed.60 Only paralegal
assistants who collect statistics know the defendants’ races. The question is how far this practice
can and should be expanded. We believe there
is potential for broader use of race blinding by
other prosecutors. Prosecutors are a good target
for race blinding given their substantial power
and impact, particularly with two pivotal decisions: the filing of charges and the negotiation
of plea bargains.

Charging Decisions
Prosecutorial practice varies in different jurisdictions. For petty offenses, a prosecutor may
make key decisions in court while facing defendants, making blinding infeasible (unless that
dynamic itself is reformed). In many jurisdictions,
however, prosecutors do not see defendants in
person when making initial charging decisions;
these are based on information provided in
police dossiers, in which race could be redacted.
In fact, the trend is for such information to be
conveyed to prosecutors electronically, making
it easier to filter the race information, perhaps
automatically by electronic tools or by intermediaries. In either case, race information could be
retained for other uses such as identification or
demographic tracking. As the Department of
Justice capital-case review committees show,
some assistants can have access to a full criminal file while decisionmakers see only race-blind
information.

Plea Bargaining
Although defendants retain the ultimate choice
about whether to accept any deal, the prosecuting and defense attorneys actually negotiate
that deal, and the prosecutor need not be
exposed to the race of the defendant. In some
jurisdictions, plea bargaining happens at arraignments with defendants in the same room. But
this practice is neither uniform nor necessary.

Thus, the two steps that are conclusive for the
vast majority of cases—charging decisions and
plea bargaining—can potentially be blinded to
race.

Limitations, Challenges, and
the Need for Pilot Testing
Although we argue for the value of race blinding
procedures, we acknowledge that there will be
difficulties and limitations in implementing such
a policy. Race should have no legitimate role in
the vast majority of charging decisions. However,
in rare situations, such as prosecutions for hate
crime, the race of an alleged perpetrator is relevant. In these cases, the necessary information
can be provided to prosecutors.
For cases in which race is irrelevant, the blinding
strategy will be effective at eliminating bias only
to the extent that prosecutors are unable to infer
race from other information available to them.
Thus, it will be necessary to remove information that could reveal race, such as photos of
a defendant; the defendant’s name;61 and, in
racially segregated communities, the defendant’s address. The practicalities of removing
all race-related information could become
complex. Further, race blinding may not be
feasible if photos contain relevant information
(such as defensive wounds on the defendant’s
skin) or eyewitness testimony describes a perpetrator’s race.
To prevent prosecutors from inferring race
from the defendants’ names, court documents
could instead identify defendants with assigned
numbers (such as driver’s license numbers).
That said, removing names may have other
unintended effects, such as reducing empathy,
leading to harsher decisions toward anonymous
defendants.62 An alternative approach would be
the use of random race-neutral pseudonyms to
achieve anonymity without erasing all trace that
a person is involved.

95%

Charged criminal
cases resolved through
plea bargaining

1/3

Black men were in
prison in 2010

$25K
average cost per
prisoner per year

The severity of punishment is a question for the
legislature. If race blinding succeeds, it levels the
playing field for all by promoting equality, even if
it decreases bias favorable to White defendants
(often referred to as White privilege).63–65 Both
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“Race disparities pervade
criminal justice decisionmaking in America”
unjustified leniency for Whites and unjustified
harsher punishments for Blacks were revealed
in 2015 by the U.S. Department of Justice Civil
Rights Division’s investigation of the Ferguson
(Missouri) Police Department. Of the many
examples discussed in the report, one clearly
highlighted the double standards: Whites were
more likely to have citations, fines, and fees
eliminated by city officials, whereas Blacks were
punished for the same minor transgressions with
expensive tickets and judgments punishing their
perceived lack of personal responsibility (pp.
74–75).66 That said, in other contexts, punishments may be harsher for Whites than for
Blacks.17 Blinding may create racial equity for
both Black and White defendants.
Given that race blinding may not be feasible
in some situations, may fail, or may have unintended consequences, the best path forward is
to pilot-test this intervention and gauge its effectiveness. Pilot testing would allow researchers to
uncover (and perhaps creatively address) challenges in the practical implementation of race
blinding; evaluate on a smaller scale the precise
impact, success, and value of race blinding;
and expose any potential unintended consequences. 33,67–69 Sequential rollouts in different
jurisdictions are also valuable, as they allow for
continued monitoring and assessment in varying
contexts.
In theory, prosecutors could be blinded to other
information that may activate biases, including
the race of the victim or the gender of the
defendant or victim. These reforms should
be considered on their own merits, including
whether empirical evidence demonstrates that
these variables are biasing prosecutorial decisions in a systematic fashion that is irrelevant to
the proper application of the law. These considerations would also apply to whether blinding
could be expanded to other decision-makers,
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including defense attorneys, judges, juries, and
parole boards.

Impact and Cost Effectiveness
The need to eliminate race bias in prosecution
is urgent. Racial biases can substantially distort
decisions, 61,70 and prosecutorial bias alone
leads to a substantial increase in the duration
and severity of punishment for minorities. A
study using 222,542 cases in New York County
during 2010–2011 found that Black defendants
were 10% more likely to be detained pretrial
compared with White defendants charged with
similar crimes, and they were 13% more likely to
receive offers of prison sentences during plea
bargaining.71 Given that a prosecutor typically
handles dozens of felonies and over a hundred
misdemeanors per year,72 the impact of racial
bias is compounded. Approximately 27,000 state
prosecutors deal with 2.9 million felony cases
per year, and 6,075 federal prosecutors secure
82,000 convictions per year, not to mention
the millions of prosecutorial decisions that are
made on misdemeanor charges.73,74 Two-thirds
of those convicted of a felony go to prison, and
the average sentence is about five years,75 at a
cost of $25,000 per prisoner per year.76 Therefore, given that prosecutors are responsible for
hundreds of person-years of incarceration annually and thus millions of dollars of public money,
even a marginal reduction in bias may have a
substantial effect.
These numbers have an impact that extends
beyond the direct experiences of people
sentenced to do time. As The Pew Charitable
Trusts reported in 2010, the income of households and the educational success of children in
those households decline when parents are put
in jail.77 The tangible and intangible costs to the
prisoners, their families, and the broader society
are tremendous.
Successfully blinding prosecutors to defendants’
race may also improve the perceived legitimacy
of prosecutorial decisions, which may enhance
compliance with the law.78 As important as
anything else, it would advance some of the
fundamental goals of our government: the equal
treatment of all citizens and justice for all.
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A New Standard: Blinding
Prosecutors to Defendants’ Race
If race blinding proves to be effective after pilot
testing, we recommend that local and state
prosecutors and the federal Department of
Justice adopt race blinding as a uniform practice. We recommend that national and statewide
associations of prosecutors (for example, the
National District Attorneys Association), as well
as broader organizations such as the American
Bar Association (ABA), support implementation
of the reforms. Furthermore, we recommend
that this imperative be written into ethical codes
and guidelines, such as the U.S. Attorneys’ Handbook Chapter 9-27.000 (USAM) and Rule 3.8 of
the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct
(1983). Our reform also relies on the ethical
behavior of attorneys, police, and other intermediaries who would not leak the race of the
defendant to prosecutors. Adoption of this norm
into the current ethical code could build on the
current norms of confidentiality.

author affiliation
Sah, Johnson Graduate School of Management,
Cornell University; Robertson, College of Law,
University of Arizona; Baughman, College of
Law, University of Utah. Corresponding author’s
e-mail: sunita.sah@cornell.edu

Race disparities pervade criminal justice decisionmaking in America. Among criminal-justice
actors, the decisions of prosecutors are the least
reviewable, are exercised with the most discretion, and are impactful. Blinding has been used
as a tool to reduce gender and race discrimination in many fields, and its value is grounded
in empirical evidence. We believe that blinding
prosecutors to a defendant’s race wherever
feasible is a timely and important proposal.
We acknowledge that there will be practical
implementation challenges and risks. Our
primary aim with this proposal is to instigate
a discussion on the merits and drawbacks of
blinding prosecutors to race and to encourage
pilot tests. The Department of Justice demonstrated the feasibility of race blinding for federal
prosecutors60 and state prosecutors could follow
suit with similar procedures for their own death
penalty cases. Expanding race blinding to other
prosecutorial decisions may seem impractical;
but, if the history of blind police lineups is any
guide, 55 the jurisdictions most committed to
racial equality and behaviorally informed policymaking will prove otherwise.
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